Is an all-inclusive conference a panacea for Ethiopia?
By Dada Talibe
January 2008 (DT) The Ethiopian political landscape is heavily crowded with a myriad of conflicting interests. The visions espoused as well as the means chosen to pursue them are also divergent. While those operating in the political process hope against hope that their deliverance will come from the ballot box, those from outside look towards popular insurrection and armed resistance as a way out. Interestingly enough neither the former nor the latter is unequivocally and fully committed to its chosen mode of struggle.
The “legal” opposition is unconvinced that EPRDF would relinquish power through the ballot box. The sobering experience of the May 2005 election can only bolster this conviction. Their choice of this means of struggle is also not based on a principled belief that the “legal” route is inherently superior to the armed in defeating tyranny. It is partly predicated on the belief that the EPRDF is more vulnerable politically than militarily.
At times the opposition blames the resistance for providing the EPRDF with a pretext to justify its draconian measures under the guise of maintaining not only peace and security but also national unity. The threat of insurgency, however ineffective, enables EPRDF to equate all dissent with subversion. At the same time, they welcome and look to the pressure exerted on EPRDF by the resistance to create more openings, breathing space, in the political process. The opposition is therefore ambivalent: while publicly shunning the resistance, it secretly wishes its success. This is one of the sources of its internal discord.
The resistance groups on the other hand took up arms as an option of last resort. Their constituents are also conflicted. While being frustrated at the sacrifices and modest progress achieved by this mode thus far, they are also not convinced that the ballot box offers any better prospect of success. As a result armed struggle is waged haphazardly and grudgingly, which may, at least partially, account for its ineptness. The resistance also looks down on the “legal” struggle and sees the whole process as a sham. This does not however preclude their openly wishing its triumph. However, the fact that EPRDF could not even tolerate weak opposition groups, let alone those with huge popular following, entrenches them in armed struggle, to which they were allured into by their bitter experience during the early 1990s when they were part of the political process. They had seen first hand and up close how EPRDF treats its opponents, especially those with a sizeable base. They have little reason to believe that EPRDF has changed since.
The resistance also at times faults the “legal” opposition for providing EPRDF with a semblance of external legitimacy. By choosing to play by its rules when they know full well that they are stacked against them, the opposition serves as a smokescreen for EPRDF’s claim of a fledgling democracy. At the same time the resistance credits the opposition for exposing EPRDF’s undemocratic nature. The squeezing and chocking of the opposition deflects domestic and international pressure on the resistance to be part of the same flawed political process. The resistance, like its civilian counterparts, is also ambivalent, which has also been a lingering source of internal friction and dissension.
During the May 2005 elections it looked as if the ballot box was about to bear fruit. A few in the resistance began to doubt the wisdom of staying out of the political process. The dissonance however quickly died down as soon as the crackdown against the CUD intensified. The continuing popularity of the OLF as well as the ability of ONLF in 2006 to bring about international limelight on the deteriorating situation in the restive Ogaden region and the country at large highlighted the promise of armed resistance. Today it is obvious that EPRDF is in a weak position both politically and militarily. Although neither electoral nor military victory is imminent at this juncture, the fact that EPRDF is politically so bankrupt gives credence to the notion that anything could happen any time.
If there is any one common agenda that is shared by all proponents of change it is the call for an all-inclusive conference. The call has been repeatedly made since the early 1990s, most consistently by OLF. It gained currency in 2006 upon the launching of AFD, which made the call for an all-inclusive dialogue the cornerstone of its policy. Like all past calls this one too was frustrated not only by lack of a positive response from EPRDF but also by the inability of the proponents of change to properly appraise the prevailing asymmetry of power and come up with robust strategies tailor made to bridge the gap.
An all-inclusive conference is a uniquely African invention. It was used principally and particularly in Francophone Africa during the 1990s to fulfill two goals: address the demands for liberalization through an inclusive process and achieve a managed transition to democracy. A national conference is a public forum, held over an extended period, at which representatives from key stakeholders discuss, develop an agreed upon “rules of the game” and jointly chart a country’s political future. Where it has worked, it has been a valuable tool to forge internal consensus on democratization and transition. However, its record in achieving democratization and smooth transition is mixed at best.
The main determinant of the success of a national conference is the balance of power between the incumbent regime and the forces of democracy and change. Unless it is on the verge of collapse the participation of the incumbent in a national conference is necessary. The incumbent is usually reluctant to assent to holding a national conference, unless forced, because of one obvious fact: national conferences usually lead to the possible disempowerment of the regime on power by making a level playing field for all.
The factors that contribute to the success of a national conference include: the goodwill and readiness of the ruling regime to share power, the neutrality of the army, the pressure and sponsorship of the international community, the potency of domestic popular pressure, and the threat of economic or general societal collapse.
After 16 long years experience of failed expectations it is vain to continue to believe that the TPLF/EPRDF will ever share power. It is ideologically and practically committed to maintaining its perpetual dominance. It believes that its very existence is dependent on its absolute domination of the political, social and economic life of the country.
In today’s Ethiopia the neutrality of the army is not to be hoped. It is an ethnic army for all intents and purposes. The officer corps is predominantly Tigrean. The regime has been successful in instilling a siege mentality among Tigrean elites in general and Tigrean officers in particular so much so that they liken their privileged life to the survival of the regime. The opposition as well as the resistance has not been effective in dispelling this misconception. It is true that the Tigrean element is not that prevalent in the rank and file. However, while disdainful of Tigrean domination, the fighting force is fractured along ethnic lines. The rank and file is confronted by a bleak choice between being reluctantly loyal to a despised regime and being literally thrown on the streets, facing abject poverty. Although high profile defections have seriously put into question the loyalty of the army to the regime, the fact that the bulk of the army is deployed on the northern borders insulates it from popular discontent simmering elsewhere.
We have seen from experience that the rhetoric of the international community on democracy and human rights, particularly when it comes to Africa, rings hallow. Their overriding policy objective is evidently the maintenance of short-term stability. Human rights and democracy can be sacrificed at the altar of stability. If a strategic resource or interest is not at stake silencing political dissent is condoned so long as a facade of law and order can be maintained. Little thought is given to the long-term implications. Meles could always play the “Islamic-Terrorism” card to win Western backing. The rest of Africa is oblivious to what is happening at home, let alone far off Ethiopia. Asian states seem unmindful to human rights and democracy. Their superseding objective is to gain access to cheap natural resources and meet their burgeoning economy’s insatiable appetite for more energy. In short in today’s Africa, freedom fighters and democrats have very few international friends and allies. No country is willing to pressure Meles to heed the call for an all-inclusive conference. None is ready to sponsor such an endeavor.
Because of the divergence in vision and contradicting interests represented, the potential threat of popular protest alone could not force the regime to the negotiating table. The trigger-happy nature of the regime dissuades many to commit to this course. Unless carried out under an all-encompassing common political agenda, incidents of civil disobedience would remain isolated, limiting their potency. When the Oromo region is engulfed by popular protests in 2005 the rest of Ethiopia was silent. When Addis erupted into riots in the aftermath of the botched elections of May 2005 the remainder of the country was asleep. The fact that the CUD is dominated by Amharic-speakers allegedly intent on dismantling the current federal structure and ending self-rule, however symbolic it is currently, is said to have discouraged the Oromo and other oppressed peoples from joining the protests in Addis. The misgivings and misrepresentation of OLF’s ultimate objective and its stand on secession by some quarters makes others unenthusiastic about joining the protests in Oromia. This enabled EPRDF to play one established interest against the other, thereby preventing the emergence of a broad-based popular resistance.
The crushing defeat of the EPRDF during the May 2005 elections has forced it to seek legitimacy outside of the political arena. Instead talk of rapid economic development is presented as an alternative source of political legitimacy. As a result, the EPRDF is on a hurried and massive spending binge with a preponderance of propaganda work to match. This has undeniably created an artificial and an untenable bubble that has in turn opened the floodgates to rising inflationary pressures. The economy is also vulnerable to shocks arising from the volatility of the global market, draught, famine, political unrest, war and other man-made disasters. However, it is difficult to envisage the EPRDF coming to the negotiation table out of worries about a possible economic meltdown.
The sudden plunge of Kenya, one of the most established African democracies, into chaos should be a clear warning for us all. If this is happening in once stable Kenya, no one can be sure that a similar development is impossible or unlikely to transpire in fragile Ethiopia where domination has long been a deeply resented phenomenon. The hegemonic status of the minority elite in the political, social and economic sphere is unmistakable. All of the many ethnic groups have experienced humiliation in the hands of the regime during the last 16 years. This is on top of an already established bitter history of domination, marginalization, exploitation and subjugation witnessed in the agonizing process of birth of Menelik’s Ethiopia and ever since, whose memory is still fresh.
Siye Abreh’s courageous testimony that the prisons in Ethiopia speak Oromo is a stern warning. It is indicative of the depth of grievance in the country’s most populous region and perhaps the most vital constituency to determine Ethiopia’s future course. This is not an idle comment coming from one of the architects of the Tigrean military machine. Brutal crackdown in Ogaden has displaced thousands. The level of bitterness there can be easily guessed. Although manifestly CUD is systematically broken up, the grievance in the urban areas and the Amhara region, where it had the most support, is palpable. However, it is impossible to envisage the EPRDF heeding the call for an inclusive conference out of fear of the risk of a social chaos in Ethiopia. This requires foresight and a sense of responsibility and accountability, which are in short supply within the EPRDF.
From its nature EPRDF oscillates between arrogance and panic. When it is in a panic mode, it accepts anything--- at least in principle, only to reverse itself later. Once it is in its over-confidence mode, it rejects off-hand any proposal with even the remotest chance of diluting its undue dominance. Currently EPRDF is projecting a false over-confidence.
Although the dire conditions warrant the holding of an all-inclusive conference to resolve the impasse in Ethiopia, EPRDF is unlikely to budge unless compelled. The first priority is to take care of the vision thing--- the synchronization of long-term goals, which takes a lot of political will and courage. Next comes the application of targeted pressure to shatter the fictitious invincibility of the EPRDF. Absent a harmonization of objectives, cooperation can only be tactical, which in turn cannot overcome the mistrust and animosity between different vested interests so as to allow the emergence of a broad-based and effective popular movement. Even if the EPRDF accepts the call for the conference at this point, it can easily manipulate the process and render it fruitless or renege on whatever promises it might make as it often does. Short of a shift in the balance of power, EPRDF won’t heed the call for an all-inclusive conference. Unfazed by the troubles within the CUD, AFD should therefore continue to consolidate by further synchronizing the goals of its diverse family and building collective muscle and teeth. Should it heed these advises, it won’t be long before EPRDF swings to its panic mode.
Dada Talibe can be reached by dtalibe@yahoo.com.
